
co-written by Richard, Hesperus and Kerry
Reviewed and edited by Jay of Astraea and Kerry
Plural
systems' members, particularly in gateway systems, are not their
bodies. That isn't to say that their bodies don't exist, that their
bodies shouldn't be looked after or that those bodies' brains do not
contain the conscious persons, but that it is not necessary for said
persons to be identified with the body or its parents, heritage,
background, ethnicity and social status.
It is rather similar to
the situation of transgendered people and transhumanists who do not
identify with their birth bodies and wish to change them: they
recognize that their conscious agency is more important to the
formation of personal identity than physical shells. There
are
differences, of course (transgendered people and transhumanists tend
not to have separate, subjective histories from the body, unless they
are also plural or have their own subjective space), but the point
still stands that it is not entirely correct to determine someone's
philosophical identity by the body alone.
Richard
Not
all have. Many members of non-gateway systems may have chosen their
appearance, or identify strongly with particular experiences. Soulbonds
and members of gateway systems are even less likely to look like the
body or identify with its history.
To use a the personal example
of our own system, no fronting Fenner, at this time, claims the body's
parents, nationality, phenotypic traits, ethnicity, heritage or
background. We are a gateway system, which means that we have our own
subjective group-space in which we live, with our own lives,
apperances, stories and backgrounds. As individuals, we don't identify
with the body's history and parents. The body's parents aren't the
individuals' parents, and its history is not the individuals' history.
That
being said, that only refers to the fronters, and there are people in
our group-space of various backgrounds and ethnicities.
Richard and Kerry
We just don't. Sorry, no philosophical answer there. We don't have to. We may not have any problems with the body, but it doesn't look like anyone in it.
Hess
Our situation does not meet the criteria for a 'delusion' because we do not apply our own histories to the body's history. In order for it to be a delusion, it would be just that. The reality of our group-space is subjective and cannot be disproved; therefore, it cannot be labelled a delusion.
Richard
Yes; here are some related links.
For a more philosophical discussion of the 'corporeal definition of reality' within an essay about the commonly accepted medical definition of plurality, read Richard's Dissociation and Assumptions, and pay particular definition to the section that talks about the body's not necessarily defining its inhabitant, or inhabitants. There's also Kerry's Race Issue article.
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